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One has to be hesitant in writing about Thurman Arnold. He was
too large and interesting a man to be encapsulated in a few paragraphs.
It is particularly hard to write about him today because this conform-
ing society sees individuals as types and dusters ideas in the same way.
Arnold was an original. Those who knew him could recognize him,
but they never ceased to be surprised by him. He had the element of
the unexpected-a common trait among the few uncommon men. He
needed a Boswell, and so far as I know he didn't have one, although
the idea he should have one was widespread. Those who knew him still
feel the glow of past incidents, even when the incidents are forgotten.
But you can't tell the story without the story. And then there are some
stories which one wouldn't tell because taken by themselves they would
not be understood.
He was a significant voice in the philosophy of law. He arose out
of the-group of legal realists, but he went his own way. He had the
capacity for taking a penetrating, humane and creative look at the
institutions of law and society. He had the driven curiosity and special
kind of objectivity of a scientist. Arnold's objectivity was aided by a
Twainian sense of humor-an ability to understand and create the
comic. But unlike Twain, there was an inner gaiety. The humaneness
involved an understanding of human error, gullibility and pretense.
It involved an enormous sympathy for individuals and a desire to be
of help. There was no pretense in the desire and drive to be of help.
Arnold was very much the lawyer with his eye on the situation calling
for a remedy. And this was so even though he knew many remedies re-
sulted in failure.
Like most realists in law, he was concerned with what courts did, and
he knew how to work with courts, but his canvas was much larger.
He wanted to make institutions work and people respond. He was
skeptical of most categories, although he used many of them, whether
of political commitment or social theories, or views of good or bad
people. He believed in civility, in reasoning, in kindness, in fair treat-
ment, in the perfectable goodness and capacity (and weakness) of all
people. He could have put his views in terms of a more formal philos-
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ophy. He was a great deal more learned than he let on. He didn't want
to be trapped by the lesser concepts which men create as pale images of
what they ought to mean, and which are then used to forestall inquiry
and block insight. The Symbols of Government and The Folhlore of
Capitalism were among the few generative works in American juris-
prudence projecting an understanding of the purposes, functioning and
flexibility of the American legal system.
Thurman Arnold was a man of concern for others. He was coura-
geous. He had enormous energy. The young man who worked in Hull
House was central to the mature lawyer-philosopher. I don't suppose
he ever thought of courage as a matter of choice. It was part of his
honesty and energy. He could not sit to be bored. His honesty was a
disciplined reflection of the insights which he had. He understood the
means which mislead and the difficulties of communication which blur
the boundaries of truth. It was a kind of comic joke on mankind that
the means of communication got in the way of communicating. But it
was one thing to enjoy the joke and quite another to be careless about
the results. He knew the uses of meanness, but he had no meanness in
him, and he did not like the results of meanness. He represented all
kinds of people because he believed in a system of law and he was in-
terested in individuals. He did not use his representation of the un-
popular as a membership card to the Temple of Causes.
He understood the propensity of all men, including himself, to be
captured by some special direction, set by the imperatives of a partic-
ular job or by positions previously taken. But his candor would evoke a
larger vision. He had the capacity and the necessity to free himself and
in that way to be himself. In the joining of skill, purpose and respon-
siveness, he became one of the great lawyers and human beings of his
time.
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